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D.R. HORTON HEARS A HUH?:
HOW MANAGEMENT-SIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS
SHOULD PREPARE FOR THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING
IN THE CLASS-ACTION WAIVERS CONTROVERSY
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I. INTRODUCTION

"What can Labor do for itself? The answer is not difficult. Labor
can organize, it can unify; it can consolidate its forces. This done,
it can demand and command."
-Eugene V. Debs
When I was younger, my mother, a hospital administrator and head of
a human resources department, came home sighing because much of her
hospital's workforce was "threatening" to unionize. She recounted to me
stories detailing why she was frustrated, specifically because unions were
"making things difficult" and because it was "easier to deal with
employees' problems individually." As I grew older and began to
understand the issues, I was confused because I never understood
unionization to be a bad thing. In fact, I always thought it was a good
thing. After all, unions are among the most common ways for laborers to
act and make their voices heard in what is otherwise an autocratic system
where employers demand and employees perform without objection.
But what about employers' rights? Surely they can have say in how
*

J.D., 2017, Univesity of Florida Levin College of Law.
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they run their business. In fact, employers need to have say in their
business and how it operates. Otherwise, they will never be able to run
the most well-oiled machines they possibly can. This is important
because performance, particularly the ability to manage profits and
costs,' of the employer is relevant for the well-being of the employees. In
the world of business, efficiency is not a luxury, it is a necessity for
survival. As much as we champion employees' rights, those rights mean
nothing if we cannot ensure that there are successful employers through
which to keep employees employed.
Today, there is a growing conflict between employees' rights to stand
up for themselves collectively and employers' needs for efficiency and
expediency. Often, the two appear difficult to harmonize at best and
impossible to reconcile at worst.
Most concretely, this conflict is realized in a wide circuit split where
the U.S. Courts of Appeals were being asked to decide whether an
employer may include in its employment contracts a provision that
requires employees to resolve their disputes with the employer through
individual arbitration. 2 Whatever the answer may be, it will result in
consequences for the balance of power between employer and employee,
in consequences for the employment relationship on the grounds, and in
consequences for the development of scholarship that informs courts and
legislators in regulating this relationship. While this struggle is currently
presented as a conflict between the National Labor Relations Act3 and the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 4 these statutes embody a deeper, more
fundamental issue: employees' labor rights versus the employers'
interests in saving costs and the law's dogged preference for arbitration.
This Note considers the consequences, both seen and unseen, for
management-side employment lawyers that may unfurl when the
Supreme Court rules on the issue. Part I lays the groundwork for this
conflict. Part II examines the framework of the laws on this issue and
summarizes the rationales of the courts that have ruled on the issue to
date. Part III considers issues that management-side employers will
inevitably come across if the Court upholds class arbitration waivers,
while Part TV considers the issues that may arise if the Court invalidates
class arbitration waivers. Part V expands and considers the consequences
of the issue on the relationship between business and individual rights.
1.

L. Anthony George, ControllingLegal Costs in Labor Arbitration,28 COLO. LAW. 75,

75(1999).
2. See Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 2016); Morris v. Ernst
& Young LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d
1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 2015); Sutherland v. Ernst& Young, LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 292 (2d Cir. 2013);
Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1051 (8th Cir. 2013); see also D.R. Horton, Inc. v.

NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
4. 9 U.S.C. § 1(2012).
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11. PRIMER ON THE DISPUTE AND COURT DECISIONS

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 1935 in
order to remedy the "inequality of bargaining power" between employees
and employers.5 The NLRA grants to private sector employees the right
to "self-organization, . . . to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concertedactivitiesfor the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . ."6
These rights are commonly referred to as Section 7 rights. Of particular
import here is the NLRA's grant to employees of the right to act together
when they have issues within the employment context.7 The NLRA
further specifies in Section 8 a series of "unfair labor practice[s],"
including, inter alia, that an employer may not "interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of [their Section 7 rights]."' Read
together, Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA provide that employees have the
right to concerted activity in the work context and such right will be
enforced against the employer who attempts to unlawfully interfere with
employees' exercise of the right.
At odds here with the NLRA is the FAA, 9 enacted in 1925 in order to
"reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that
had . . . been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts."o The FAA
provides that written provisions in contracts providing for settling of
controversies through arbitration "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."" Through the FAA, Congress mandated
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms. 12 And
over the approaching one hundred years since its enactment, the United
States Supreme Court has developed a substantial pro-arbitration
jurisprudence upholding arbitration agreements per their terms. 13
Although the FAA and the Court have made it difficult to overcome
an arbitration agreement as written, Congress did not intend the FAA's
5. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
6. Id. § 157 (emphasis added).
7. Id.
8. Id. § 158.
9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
10. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); see also Hall St.
Assocs. LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008)
11. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
12. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478
(1989).
13. See, e.g, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015); Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333
(2011); Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting that
the FAA reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration).
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mandate to be limitless in power. The FAA includes a "savings clause,"
which provides that an arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable
"save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." 1 4 In the savings clause, Congress limits that arbitration
agreements as written are valid and enforceable unless the provision
violates other law or is otherwise unenforceable in equity.1 5 Specifically,
arbitration agreements should be enforced per their terms unless "the
Arbitration Act's mandate has been overridden by a contrary
congressional command"1 6 or the agreement was a product of fraud,
duress, or other common law defense to the enforcement of a contract.
Since 2013, the question of whether an employer violates the NLRA
when it includes an individual arbitration provision in its employment
contracts has been addressed by five different United States Courts of
Appeals.' 7 Emerging from the proverbial flames has been a 3-2 circuit
split.18 Three circuits have found that individual arbitration provisions do
not violate the employees' rights to concerted action,'9 while two, as well
as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 2 0 have found that these
provisions do violate the employees' rights to concerted action. 2 1
Recognizing such a wide circuit split, the United States Supreme Court
has granted certiorari to three now-consolidated cases in order to decide
upon the issue. 2 2
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, joining the rule of the NLRB,2 3 have
found that the right to concerted activity under section 7 of the NLRA
bestows upon employees a substantive right.24 They further agree that
14. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
15. See AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 339 (2011).
16. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
17. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016); Morris v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir.
2015); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care,
Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).
18. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7thCir. 2016); Morris v. Ernst& Young
LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir.
2015); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care,
Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).
19. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); Sutherland v.
Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th
Cir. 2013) (finding that pursuant to the FAA, individual arbitrations do not violate the NLRA right
to concerted action because employees' rights to concerted activity may be waived).

20. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012).
21. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016); Morris v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that individual arbitration provisions that preclude
employees from resolving disputes in concerted actions do violate the NLRA).

22. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016); Morris v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir.
2015).
23.

See In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012).

24. See, e.g., Morris, 834 F.3d at 986.
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substantive rights, unlike procedural rights, cannot be waived in
arbitration agreements.2 5 Because Section 7 rights are the "central,
fundamental protections of the Act," the NLRA becomes meaningless if
the substantive right to concerted employee activity could be waived in
an arbitration agreement. 2 6 The Circuit Courts go further and find that
despite the strong commands of the FAA, the FAA's savings clause does
prevent the enforcement of the waiver of a substantive federal right.2 7
The Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have each stated, either in
holding or dicta that class waivers do not violate the NLRA when
considering them in light of the FAA's demands. 28 The Fifth Circuit
found that the NLRA contains no congressional command either in its
language or legislative history to override the FAA's enforcement
mandate. 29 The Eighth Circuit, although not specifically addressing an
NLRA challenge, rejected the appellant's reliance on the NLRA and the
NLRB's decision in In re D.R. Horton3 o when she argued that it was the
"public policy of the United States . . . [] to protect workers' rights to
engage in concerted activities." 31 Finding no overriding congressional

commands, both circuits upheld the class waivers according to the
Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, interesting is the effect of class action waivers against
the rule of law and the word of Congress. Although the interplay between
the NLRA and the FAA muddles the intent behind the NLRA, the
NLRA's plain language appears clear: "[e]mployees shall have the right
to ... engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual
aid or protection." 32 "[O]ther concerted activities" includes the right to
bring concerted action, whether it be through a lawsuit, concerted
arbitration, or other mechanisms for dispute resolution.3 3 If the Court
25. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161; Morris, 834 F.3d at 981.
26. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161; Morris, 834 F.3d at 986.
27. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1158; Morris, 834 F.3d at 986; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.").

28. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); Owen v. Bristol
Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013); see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d
290 (2d Cir. 2013); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 351 n.5 (5th Cir. 2013). Although
the Second Circuit did not address in its opinion whether a class arbitration waiver violates the

NLRA, it did state in a footnote that, like the Eighth Circuit, it declines to follow the NLRB's
decision in D.R Horton, quoting language from the Eighth Circuit decision indicating that it will
not invalidate class waivers where doing so would infringe upon the FAA and other federal policy.

29. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); D.R. Horton, Inc.
v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013); Owen, 702 F.3d at 1052.
30. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012).
31. See Owen, 702 F.3d at 1053.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
33. See, e.g., Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1255 (2016);
Brady v. National Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (2011).
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finds in favor of class action waivers, the message sent by the Court
would be that employees' Section 7 rights are not as absolute as the
NLRA suggests because the interests of the FAA trump those of the
NLRA. Certainly many employers would be happy to eliminate another
pesky tool in the employee toolbox. The natural consequence of this
would be that individual arbitration and concerted action waivers would
become ubiquitous in employment contracts.
Such an effortless dismissal of section 7 rights here appears an odd
result, however. Congress not only granted employees the right to
concerted action, but it even included provisions for its enforcement.
Section 8 of the NLRA provides: "[iut shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer .

.

. to interfere with, restrain,or coerce employees in the

exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]."34 Certainly by including
a provision forbidding employees from bringing actions in concert,
employers are "restraining" employees' section 7 rights per the language
of the statute by limiting their dispute resolution to one-on-one arbitration
with the employer where the statute otherwise provides for concerted
action. 35
Despite being unable to bring concerted actions against employers
should concerted action waivers be held enforceable, employees would
not be left helpless under the NLRA. Included in section 7 rights are the
rights to "self-organization, [and] to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing."36 Employees therefore still have the right to
organize amongst themselves, to join unions, and to enter into collective
bargaining with the employer. Concerted action waivers, at present, do
not include any restriction on these rights. 37
If employees effectively waive their rights to seek recourse in concert,
then they must look elsewhere in order to protect their interests. It is
arguably preferable for employees to protect their interests prospectively
through unionization and collective bargaining than retrospectively
through arbitration or litigation (once the damage has been done and the
animosity has been bred). However, the wisdom of how employees
enforce their rights is only remotely marginal to this discussion.
The enforcement of concerted action waivers effectively backs
employees up against a wall and considerably curtails their ability to
preserve their interests. Such a cornering would put employees in a
position where they must be more proactive in unionizing and collective
34.
35.

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
See Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740 (1983) (the interpretation

of an act that "restrain[s]" under the NLRA has been liberally construed).

36.
37.

29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
See id. § 158(a)(1) (increasing the likelihood that efforts made by employers to lessen

these rights will constitute an unfair labor practice).

D.R. HORTON HEARS A HUH?

2017]1

359

bargaining. As of 2015, the union membership rate for private-sector
workers was a paltry 6.7 percent.3 8 Such a low unionization rate coupled
with a reduced ability of employees to bring their grievances post-hoc
will lead to lower, and less successful, chances for employees to
successfully vindicate their rights and interests against their employers.
Without forward-thinking action by employees, employers become much
more able to do as they please with their employees outside of specifically
delineated unlawful practices. Of course, the silver lining, if there ever
was one, is that the enforcement of concerted action waivers may lead to
increased unionization rates and increased involvement in collective
bargaining, both of which may lead to considerably better working lives
for employees than if they maintained the simple ability to bring
concerted actions.
Of course, enforcing such concerted action waivers and individual
arbitration provisions further the policy interests behind arbitration of
efficiency, expediency, and informality.3 9 Stated otherwise, arbitration is
supposed to be a more "quick and painless" dispute resolution method.
Without concerted action waivers and individual arbitration provisions,
employees would likely be able to storm the floodgates of dispute
resolution. Where a dispute involves a single employee and a single
employer, the process is ostensibly more smooth and straightforward.4 0
Where arbitration or litigation involves several employees, the task
becomes much more difficult, requiring coordination of additional parties
and reconciliation of individual differences. 4 1 Ultimately, the process
becomes significantly moored and loses considerable value in being a
simpler, more manageable ordeal, and the NLRA acts as a strong-arm
against employers in favor of employees.
Until the Supreme Court rules on how these competing interests ought
to be balanced, discussions on the merits of each side will be tireless.
Employer-clients, who are affected by the law on the ground, however,
are arguably less interested in the theoretical fervor of each argument and
are more interested in knowing how the law affects them and their
business. To that end, below, we take up a question-based approach of
how management-side employment lawyers should advise their
employer-clients when they come to their offices for advice on how to
handle class arbitration waivers and any potential Supreme Court ruling.
This Note seeks to explore some of the foremost-likely questions on
clients' minds, and is tailored to anticipate questions that will arise if the
Supreme Court chooses to either uphold class waivers or invalidate them.
38. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS: U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS-2015 (Jan. 26,
2017, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.

39.
40.
41.

See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011).
Id at 349-50.
Id
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MANAGEMENT-SIDE LAWYERS SHOULD ADVISE CLIENTS IF
CLASS ARBITRATION WAIVERS ARE UPHELD

If waivers are upheld, employees will probably look to other ways to
advocate their interests. How should I prepare for and resist against
increased chances of unionization, collective bargaining agreements, and
other kinds of methods of advocating their rights?
Employees who have had the ability to bring class actions or class
arbitrations over disputes with their employers removed will have a more
difficult time in attempting to vindicate their rights post-hoc. Especially
in cases where employees would be limited to relatively small awards (as
in claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act,42 for example),
employees are less likely to bring any claims at all because they are
simply not worth the cost and stress of pursuing. Consider, for example,
that an employee may be owed $1000 in unpaid wages, and is governed
by an arbitration agreement that does not stipulate that the employer will
pay the employee's costs and fees associated with arbitration. In such a
case, an employee may be forced to spend, say, $10,000 to recover a mere
$2,000.43 Such an endeavor by an employee would not only be illadvised, but near insane. The small chance of effective vindication" by
an employee of his or her rights in individual arbitration is likely to have
a chilling effect on the total number of claims even brought, as, among
other reasons, employees will be hard-pressed to find attorneys willing to
work on cases worth so little. 45 Given the low awards involved in many
employment cases, being able to join claims, and thus damages, is one
strong way for employees to entice attorneys to take their cases.
Reduced likelihood of claims in tow, employees will look to different
ways of vindicating their rights. Where an employee sees that their
employer has limited their ways of redressing their grievances, that
employee is inevitably going to feel an air of distrust toward the
employer. Among other reasons, lack of respect and feelings of unfair
treatment by an employer are common motivators for employees to look
to unions for fair representation. 46 Similarly, employees' attitudes and
satisfaction with their employer-company have an overwhelming effect

42. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (providing that employees are owed their unpaid wages and
overtime, as applicable, along with an equal amount in liquidated damages).
43. See id.
44. See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)
(providing an applied explanation of the effective vindication doctrine in arbitration).
45. John Campbell, Unprotected Class: Five Decisions, Five Justices, and Wholesale
Change to Class Action Law, 13 Wyo. L. REv. 463,465 (2013).
46. Fisher & Phillips, Reasons Employees Give for Joining a Union (Nov. 1, 2009),
https://www.fisherphillips.con/resources-newsletters-article-reasons-employees-give-for-joinin
g-a-union.

361

D.R HORTON HEARS A HUH?

2017]1

on the workers' desire to join a union.4 7 The two concepts run parallel to
each other and have a significant effect on employee unionization desires.
Accordingly, when employers face a threat of their employees
unionizing, they must be prepared to defend against it.
A surprisingly simple, yet highly effective way of deterring
employees from unionizing is making it known, either directly or
indirectly, that employers, as management, do not favor unionization or
collective action. Indeed, known or perceived opposition to unionization
by employers is a major reason why employees ultimately do not seek
union representation. 4 8 Employers, however, ought to tread lightly in
undertaking these tactics, as it is probable that such a deterrence
technique may amount to an unfair labor practice in violation of the
NLRA.4 9 Tempting as its efficacy may be, management counsel should
stay away from advising clients to affirmatively establish such an
atmosphere of union-dislike.
There are fewer methods of learning how to do something better than
modeling success. No business has been more successful at "union
busting" than megacorporation Wal-Mart.5 0 Although its methods seem
to do their hardest to push the legal limits of combating unions,5 1 WalMart's model does offer some otherwise very legitimate methods that
employers in all industries can extrapolate for their own usage. And in a
potential United States that upholds class waivers notwithstanding the
NLRA, employers must be vigilant and attentive to the increased threat
of unionization.
The most obvious feature of Wal-Mart's anti-union crusade is the
sheer amount of attention it gives to even the slightest inkling of
unionization in one of its stores. It utilizes a union activity hotline in its
headquarters at Bentonville, Arkansas to receive notice of in-store
happenings from managers and department-heads in the individual
stores.52 At a moment's notice, and presumably only for credible,
substantial threats, Wal-Mart dispatches members of its "labor team" to
the store to take appropriate action. 53 A look at Wal-Mart's internal guide
to fighting unions and monitoring its workers reveals an incredibly
47. See Barry A. Friedman et al., FactorsRelated to Employees'Desire to Join and Leave
Unions, 45 INDUS. REL.: J. EcoN. & Soc'y 102, 107 (2006); see also Tracey A. Cullen, What to
do Before the Union Knocks, 16 N.Y. ENIw. L. LETTER 4 (2009).
48. Richard B. Freeman, Briefing Paper, Do Workers Still Want Unions? More than Ever,

182 EcoN. Po'Y INST. 1, 9 (Feb. 22 2007), http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bpl82/bpl82.pdf
49.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, INTERFERING WITH EMPLOYEE RIGHTS (SECTION

7 & 8(A)(1)), https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employe

e-rights-section-7-8al (last visited Nov. 11, 2016); see also 29 U.S.C.

§ 158 (2016).

50. For an incredibly detailed look at how Wal-Mart combats unions, see Nelson
Lichtenstein, How Wal-Mart Fights Unions, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1462 (2008).

51.
52.
53.

See id. at 1495-96.
See id. at 1492-93.
See id. at 1492.
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serious anti-union philosophy that prioritizes vigilance on the ground,
immediate notification to headquarters, and strict guidelines on what
actions by managers are lawful or unlawful.54
To be sure, most employers will not have the types of resources that
Walmart has to execute such a well-oiled machine. Nevertheless,
management counsel ought to note to its clients that, like Walmart, it
should learn to recognize the early warning signs of unionization and act
appropriately to neutralize them before they spread like a malignant
disease. The efficacy of such a method, inter alia, is evident in the fact
that Walmart has no unionized stores in any of its 4,17755 (in 2014) stores
in the United States. 56
If employees become aware that their employer has eliminated a
powerful method of redressing their grievances, the employees are
inevitably going to harbor some ill-will and suffer a loss of trust, seeing
their employer more as an adversary than a partner. Although an
employer may not be able to eliminate this sense entirely, it can act to
mitigate it such that the employees may not even come to think about
unionization.
As Walmart has demonstrated, attention and promptness to employees
and unionization warning signs is a strong tool for employers. At any
early signs of unionization, such as grumbling at wages, poor working
conditions, unfair treatment, or unusual, reclusive behavior by
employees, employers ought to take quick action to mitigate the potential
precursors of unionization before they become something less
manageable.
All employers should take proactive and preventative steps against
unionization. However, employers who promulgate class arbitration
waivers ought to be particularly mindful of preventative unionization
efforts given their increased risk of unionization threats.
I understand that class action waivers have been upheld, but is there
any sort of chance that these provisions could still be unenforceable if I
include them in my employees' agreements? The fact that arbitration
language simply exists in an agreement is insufficient to render it
enforceable. The FAA provides that arbitration agreements will be held
valid "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."5 7 This has been held to include such
54.

Walmart,

Walmart Labor Relations

Training: Salaried Manager Module,

https://www.docdroid.net/861n/manager-training.pdf html (last visited Nov. 12, 2016).
55. Krystina Gustafson, Time to Close Wal-Mart Stores? Analysts Think So, CNBC (Jan.
31, 2014, 3:21 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/01/31/time-to-close-wal-mart-stores-analysts-

think-so.html.
56. Bryce Covert, Walmart Penalized for Closing Store Just After it Unionized,
THINKPROGRESS (June 30, 2014), https://thinkprogress.org/walmart-penalized-for-closing-store-

just-after-it-unionized-70945f29e349#.970rpsldl.
57. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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commonly applicable contract defenses as, inter alia, fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, but does not include defenses that are only applicable
to arbitration or that "derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement
to arbitrate is at issue." 58
What this means for employers is that they ought not subscribe to
unsavory practices in order to procure these class action waivers. While
there is undoubtedly a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, 59
employers ought to remember that their arbitration agreements are not
totally immune from assault. Attempting to procure such an agreement
by any of the above-mentioned methods will render the arbitration
agreement unenforceable. 60
There is a rumbling sentiment, however, that federal FAA
jurisprudence after AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion is consuming
aspects of state contract law.6' Not surprisingly then, challengers have
begun to develop theories under which the Court's holding in Concepcion
can be undermined or circumvented.6 2 Most notably, the issue of whether
an arbitration agreement can be invalidated because the plaintiff's costs
of arbitration would exceed their potential recovery reached the Supreme
Court in American Express Co. v. Italian ColorsRestaurant.63 There, the
Court held that even with the judge-made effective vindication exception
to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement, there is no contrary
congressional command sufficient to override the mandate of the FAA.64
Thus, the Court continued a long line of jurisprudence upholding the
strength of the FAA even in cases that are arguably "conservative and
anti-consumer." 65 Though this tendency to uphold arbitration agreements
should comfort employers to some degree, it should also signal to
employers that the issue of arbitration agreements are hotly contested,
and that they should remain on the alert for changes in the law that could
render them unenforceable.

58. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); see also Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93
(1987).
59.

See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015); Am. Express Co. v.

Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333,
333 (2011); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting
that the FAA reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration").

60.

AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 339.

61. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA PreemptionAfter Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 155, 155 n.8 (2014).

62.
63.
64.

Id.
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2307 (2013).
Id. at 2309.

65. James Dawson, Comment, Contract After Concepcion: Some Lessons from the State
Courts, 124 YALE L.J. 233 (2014), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/comment/contract-afterconcepcion-some-lessons-from-the-state-courts.
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IV. How MANAGEMENT-SIDE LAWYERS SHOULD ADVISE CLIENTS IF
CLASS ARBITRATION WAIVERS ARE INVALIDATED

If class waivers are held invalid, how do I prepare for and protect
against the likely, and maybe even probable, increase in complexity and
costs of the arbitration process? If class action waivers are invalidated,
employers risk having to handle employees' claims (be it for wage
claims, discrimination issues) in concert. This, together with the
increasingly "legalistic" nature of the arbitration process, 66 will likely
make the arbitration process more costly, more complicated, and more
time-consuming. Such changes run contrary to the very spirit of
arbitration, whose primary benefits arise from it being more informal,
expedient, and cost-effective than litigation. 67 Thus, when faced with a
potentially complex 68 arbitration by virtue of more individuals in the
complaining party, employers would be wise to remember the ideals at
the core of the arbitration process to ensure that the process proceeds at
maximum efficiency.
Of course, that is not to suggest that in order to be effective, arbitration
must take no time or result in virtually no costs (in fact, depending on the
complexity of the dispute, its costs may even exceed those of litigation 69).
An effective arbitration is one that strikes a harmonious balance between
being expeditious and cost-effective and being a procedure that achieves
a fair and complete hearing to satisfactorily resolve the dispute for all
parties involved.7 0
Attorneys are duty-bound to represent their client as best as possible,
which could reasonably lead to the attorney, quite simply, taking
advantage of every opportunity and mechanism they have to advocate
their clients' interests.7 1 Such zealousness has the potential to encumber
the arbitration process by way of lengthy hearings, increased depositions,
requests for continuances, submission of needless motions, and the
66.

John A. Sherrill, Effectively Managing a Complex Commercial Arbitration, NAT'L

ACADEMY OF DISTINGUISHED NEUTRALS (2010), http://www.nadn.org/articles/SherrillJohn-

EffectivelyManagingAComplexCommercialArbitration(May20O10).pdf.
67. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011).
68. Use of the descriptors "large" and "complex" is more broad here compared to the
American Arbitration Association's use of similar words. Here, "large" and "complex" do not
refer to the monetary value of the parties' claims, exclusive of interest, arbitration fees, and other
costs. Rather, here, "large" and "complex" simply refer to arbitration proceedings that have
become larger and more complicated, as commonly understood, by virtue of the fact that there are
additional parties to consider and juggle throughout the entire process. See Raymond G. Bender,
Jr., Critical First Steps in Complex Commercial Arbitration: Appointing Qualified Arbitrators
and Staging the PreliminaryConference, 64 DisP. RESOL. J. 28,30 (2009).
69. See Benoit, infra note 74, at 164.
70. John Wilkinson, Streamlining Arbitration of the Complex Case, 55 Disp. RESOL. J. 8
(2000).
71. Sherrill, supra note 66, at 8.
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introduction of an unnecessary number of witnesses, among other
things. 72 Because cost-saving is virtually always a premier goal in
arbitration (in fact, it is often the primary benefit of arbitration),73 the

"fishing expeditions" involved in deposing multiple witnesses,
conducting unnecessarily extensive discovery, and filing innumerable
motions are largely disfavored in arbitration. 74 Instead, arbitrators will
allow only the witnesses, documents, and motions that are key to the
sufficiency of the process, disallowing the merely tangentially related
*75
documents and witnesses.
Thus, the parties, and particularly the attorneys and arbitrators, ought
to remain conscious of streamlining the efficiency of the process from its
beginning to its end.7 6 This includes, inter alia, selecting the arbitrator(s)
and conducting the preliminary conference. 77 Although the use of a single
arbitrator may be more convenient and simpler to manage, such
convenience and simplicity may come at the expense of fairness or
expertise. 78 A panel of three arbitrators, though more costly and likely
more difficult to organize in terms of scheduling, comes with additional
benefits. Unlike a single arbitrator, a panel of arbitrators would offer to
the process varying expertise and perspectives (which may be necessary
in more technical or heavily factual cases, such as those involving wages
or discrimination) to ensure fairness and full consideration of the claims
and defenses.79 Accordingly, the parties ought to balance their needs for
multiple perspectives against their needs to cut costs.
Similarly, the parties and the arbitrators should be sure to either reach
an agreement as to, or otherwise establish, the scope and limits of various
procedural tactics.80 This should include limits on motion practice,
discovery, depositions, witness testimony, discovery disputes, hearings,
briefs, oral arguments, and other processes.8 ' Each of these has
significant potential for abuse, which can needlessly lengthen the time
necessary to reach a resolution, raising costs exponentially. Thus, for the
sake of maintaining an efficient process, the parties and arbitrators should
be mindful of limiting each of these in time and scope. For example,
72. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 70.
73. Brent Benoit, Transcending Disciplines: What Every TransactionalLawyer Should
Know about Litigation, 45 TEX. J. Bus. L. 143, 163 (2013).
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 164.
77. Raymond G. Bender, Jr., Critical First Steps in Complex Commercial Arbitration:
Appointing QualifiedArbitrators and Staging the PreliminaryConference, 64 DISP. RESOL. J. 28,

30 (2009).
78. Id. at 31.
79. Id.
80. Limiting the scope of discovery is one of the biggest factors contributing to reduced
costs of arbitration when compared to litigation. See Benoit, supra note 73, at 164.
81. Bender, supra note 77.
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depositions may be limited to half-days, witness testimony limited to only
key witnesses, time limits may be imposed on discovery, and motions
may be left to the decision of only the chair of the arbitration panel, if
applicable, as opposed to the entire panel of arbitrators. 8 2 Therefore, in
order for employers to enjoy the continued efficiency and expediency of
arbitration, they must take active steps to limit the process to what is
necessary and avoid any "fluff' that will needlessly weigh down the
process to the detriment of all parties involved. Often, doing so involves
diligent budgeting of the legal fees and expenses. 8 3 Similarly, employers
must be mindful of their own expenses, not just the out-of-pocket
expenses specific to the arbitration process. This includes such oftenforgotten things as loss of productive time of employees spent laboring
over the arbitration process (e.g., searching for documents, organizing
files, communicating with parties and arbitrators) that take away from the
company's own business.8
Can I still include class arbitration waivers for employees who are not
covered under the NLRA like supervisors? Presumably, yes. Section 3 of
the NLRA explicitly excludes supervisors from its definition of
"employee." Thus, the protections of the NLRA to concerted action are
not afforded to supervisors. 8 6 Unless Congress or the Supreme Court
states otherwise, employers ought to remain free to maintain class action
waivers in their employment agreements for their supervisors without
running afoul of a Supreme Court decision that invalidates class action
waivers. The same exclusions apply to all managerial employees, not just
strictly "supervisors." 87 Nevertheless, employers ought to remain vigilant
of developments in the law for any changes in the coverage-status of more
higher-ranking employees.
Of course, employers ought to be wary, as an individual's job title is
not dispositive of his or her coverage under the NLRA. In order to be
excluded from the NLRA as a statutory "supervisor," the employee
must:8 8 (1) hold authority to engage in any of a number of supervisory
functions defined in the NLRA, (2) exercise such authority using
independent judgment, not just in a routine or clerical manner, and (3)
exercise such authority "in the interest of the employer." 89 Likewise,
managerial employees are those who "formulate and effectuate
management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions
82.
83.

76 (1999).
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See generally Wilkinson, supra note 70, at I1.
L. Anthony George, ControllingLegal Costs in Labor Arbitration,28 Co.

Id. at 77.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
Id.
NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1994).
NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713 (2001).
Health Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. at 573-74.
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of their employer." 90
Although employers ought to remain free to include class action
waivers in their employment agreements with supervisorial and
managerial employees, employers ought to carefully consider the job
duties and authority of the particular employee to determine whether or
not such a waiver will be invalidated under a Supreme Court ruling that
invalidates class action waivers.
Can I include the arbitration provision in the agreement anyway? I
know it is unenforceable, but could I just leave it in the contract as a
deterrent? Sophisticated entities commonly leave unenforceable
provisions in contracts, even when they are fully aware that these
provisions are unenforceable.91 This occurrence is particularly prevalent
in the employment context, in contrast to other settings. 9 2 Such a practice
appears to be a relatively common litigation strategy designed to deter
the other party to the contract. 9 3 In effect, the mere inclusion of these
provisions may help the imposing party (here, the employer) because
either: (1) the other party simply does not know that the provision is
invalid 9 4 or (2): the other party is not going to expend the resources
needed to prove that the provision is unenforceable.9 5 Often, there is a
low risk-reward ratio for the employer by including these unenforceable
provisions because courts take such a lax approach toward them.9 6 And
even if the provision is unenforceable, courts frequently will blue-pencil
the provision to make it enforceable or will otherwise enforce the rest of
the agreement without the offending provision. 9 7 Arguably, a small
proportion of employees will be willing to challenge these provisions, if
any, and the employer may continue along with the terms of the provision
as though it were enforceable. In effect, even if an employee attempts to
challenge the provision, the employer would likely receive little more
than a slap on the wrist for its inclusion.
However, a different risk exists with employing this litigation strategy
in the context of a class action waiver. If class action waivers are
invalidated, and employees thus have the right to bring concerted action
against the employer, an employer may run afoul of the NLRA by
nevertheless including such a provision. The employer's inclusion of that
provision may rise to the level of an unfair labor practice under Section 8

90.

NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974).

91.

Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contracts Terms, 70

OIo ST. L.J. 1127, 1127 (2009).
92. Id
93. Id. at 1131.
94.

Id

95.

Id

96.

Id at 1134.

97.

Id. at I131-32.
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of the NLRA. 9 8 In particular, such an inclusion could be considered a
restraint on or interference' with the employees' Section 7 rights (here,
the ability to organize and bring concerted action). That is, employees
who arguably do not have the legal wherewithal to know that a provision
is unenforceable may see the provision and simply assume that it is
enforceable. Presumably, the issue of whether such a provision amounts
to an unfair labor practice will be discussed in a Supreme Court ruling
invalidating class action waivers. But even if not, given the NLRB's
tendency to establish particular employer actions as unfair labor practices
under Section 8(a)(1), it would appear to be a high risk by the employer
to nevertheless include such a provision even after it has been invalidated.

V.

EXPANSION AND CONCLUSION

Although the issue here is framed as one between the NLRA and the
FAA, the underlying rationale and policy should be understood more as
one between the rights of the business versus the rights of the individual.
Here, it seems somewhat likely that the present Roberts Court would rule
in favor of upholding the class action waivers (especially assuming that
President Donald Trump will appoint a ninth Supreme Court Justice who
will presumably have a more pro-business and pro-arbitration pedigree).
Indeed, the Roberts Court has been criticized as being particularly
conservative and pro-business.1 00 Such claims appear to be more than just
biased left-wing criticism. In fact, Professors Lee Epstein and William
Landes, and Judge Richard Posner recently conducted a study finding,
inter alia, that of the ten most pro-business Supreme Court Justices since
1946, five were on the bench at the time of the study's publication in 2013
(including Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas,
Kennedy, and the late Justice Scalia).101
Similarly, the present Roberts Court has continued a snowballing
jurisprudence in favor of arbitration and the FAA. 10 2 Although the
NLRA's mandate appears clear, it seems unlikely that such a probusiness and pro-arbitration Court will find in favor of invalidating class
action waivers.
Regardless of the Court outcome, however, employers will have much
98.
99.
100.

29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
Id. § 158(a)(1).
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, CorporationsFinda Friendin the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES,

May 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-definin
g-this-supreme-court.htmi (last visited Dec. 23, 2016).
101. Lee Epstein et al., How Business Faresin the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REv. 1431,

1471 (2013) (ranking the most pro-business Justices to serve on the Supreme Court since 1946).
102. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 369 (2011).
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to adjust for and much to consider going forward. Even if employers
leave this dispute with a "victory" in the form of an upholding of class
action waivers, they will have to prepare for the very real possibility of
their employees unionizing in order to protect their interests. In such a
scenario, an upholding of class waivers may ultimately prove to be a
hollow victory, as some employers may find it preferable to deal with
class actions than to deal with unionization. On the flip side, if class
waivers are invalidated, employers will have to become a bit more
creative in their endeavors and practices in order to make sure their
businesses are prepared to handle and mitigate the costs and time
expenses of dealing with any potential concerted actions by employees.
Most important for employers, however, is that they continue to remain
vigilant of developments in the law and act accordingly. While
unfortunately for employers, they cannot control the direction of the law,
they can control their own preparation and how they respond to however
the tide may turn.
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